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The legislatures of practically all of the states have seen fit to
frame statutes dealing with criminal negligence. These statutes are
not confined to regulations pertaining to homicide, but also provide
punishment for the negligent injury to human beings and to property.
That the term "criminal negligence" enters into statutory criminal law
is evidenced by statutes of which that of Montana is typical. This
statute provides that "In every crime or public offense there must exist
a uiiion or joint operation of actual intention or criminal negligence.",
The states differ in denominating the crime for which one whose
negligence results in the death of another shall be punished. The
entire gamut is run from second degree manslaughter to first degree
murder. There is also a perceptible difference in the words used to
refer to and to denote criminal negligence in the statutes of the vari-
ous states. This writing will attempt to classify the statutes dealing
with criminal negligence, and by pointing out and comparing the
various types, to determine which of these are to be preferred.
Of course, those statutes relating to criminal negligence from
which homicide results make up the greater part of all the statutes
dealing with criminal negligence, and it is with these that we shall
be first concerned. Five states, New York, Colorado, Alabama, Wash-
ington, and Utah, include within their statutes defining first degree
murder a provision which states that homicide resulting from the
doing of "any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others and indi-
cating a depraved mind, regardless of human life" is punishable as
first degree murder.2 Precisely the same wording is used in the sec-
ond degree murder statutes of Florida, Wisconsin, and Oregon.
3 It is
instantly observable that culpability within the meaning of the phrase-
ology of these statutes is dependent upon something more than ordi-
nary negligence, and that the reference is to something akin to reck-
less disregard. It could not be said of these statutes what was said
by the Mississippi court in regard to the type of negligence punishable
under a statute of that state, to the effect that the degree of negli-
gence required was merely the omission to do something, or doing
something which a reasonable prudent person would or would not do.
4
'Mont. Rev. Code (Choate, Supp. 1927) Sec. 10726.
2Colo. Ann. Stat. (Courtright, 1927) See. 1753; Ala. Code (1923)
Sec. 4454; Code of Wash. (Pierce, 1929) See. 8997; Utah Rev. Stat.
(1933) Sec. 103-28-3; Consolidated Laws of N. Y. (Cahill, 1930) Sec.
1044.
'Fla. Comp. Laws (1927) Sec. 1137; Wis. Stat. (1933) Sec. 340.03;
Ore. Code Ann. (1930) Sec. 14-203.
'Robertson v. State, 153 Miss. 770, 121 So. 492 (1928).
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The phrases "depraved mind" and "regardless of human life" appar-
ently pertain to more than mere ordinary negligence.
A number of states follow the common law in omitting to make
any distinction as to degrees of murder. Of these, Mississippi employs
wording identical with that used in the above mentioned statutes.5
Other states in this group, also punishing such offense as murder, in-
cluding South Dakota, Ohio, and North Dakota, supplement their stat-
utes with the provision that "Homicide perpetrated by an act immi-
nently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind, regardless
of human life Is none the less murder because there is not an actual
intent to injure others."0 However, such provision does not serve to
change the effect of the statute, in that ordinary negligence would not
be sufficient.
A similar diversity of treatment is found among those states
whose manslaughter statutes encompass the concept of criminal negli-
gence. There are only two states, Minnesota and Wisconsin, making a
negligent homicide punishable as first degree manslaughter; and the
statutes of these states are confined to the doing of specific acts. The
Minnesota statute provides that one who shoots another carelessly in
mistaking him for a deer or other animal is guilty of manslaughter in
the first degree.' Wisconsin's act states that culpable negligence while
engaged In the commission or the attempt to commit a crime less than
a felony, resulting in the death of another, is punishable as first degree
manslaughter. 8
While the number of states making a negligent homicide punish-
able as first degree manslaughter is comparatively small, those states
dealing with it as involuntary or second degree manslaughter comprise
a comparatively large group. Illinois, Georgia, Colorado, and Arkansas
have acts stating that homicide resulting from the doing of "a lawful
act which probably might produce such consequences" is involuntary
manslaughter.9 Idaho and California also classify the offense as in-
voluntary manslaughter, but as resulting from the doing of "a lawful
act without due caution and circumspection." 0 Three other states,
Utah, New Mexico, and Montana, also classify criminal negligence as
involuntary manslaughter, differing only in that they combine both
the phrase "lawful act which probably might produce such conse-
quences" and the phrase "lawful act without due caution and circum-
&MIss. Code Ann. (1930) Sec. 985.
S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) Sees. 4012, 4016; Ohio Code Ann. (1934)
See. 2216; N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913, Supp. 1925) Sec. 9462.
' Minn. Stat. (1923) See. 10075.
"Wis. Stat. (1933) Sec. 340.10.
o Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935) c. 38, Sec. 342; Ga. Code Ann. (Parks, 1914,
Supp. 1926) Sec. 67; Colo. Ann. Stat. (Courtright, 1927) See. 1757; Ark.
Dig. Stat. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) Sec. 2356.
1 Code of Idaho (1932) Sec. 17-1106; Cal. Gen. Laws (1931) Sec.
192.
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spection" with the preposition "or".u Arkansas specifically provides
that death resulting from negligence in overloading any boat operated
for gain, or from negligence in placing excessive steam in the boilers
of steamboats, is punishable as involuntary manslaughter.'-
A typical statute of those in the second degree manslaughter group
is that of Ohio. It provides that "Every killing of a human being by
the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another which under
the provisions of this chapter is not murder or manslaughter in the
first degree, or not justifiable homicide, is second degree man-
slaughter."" States having almost identical statutes are North Dakota,
New York, New Hampshire, South Dakota, and Minnesota.' Among
the specific negligent acts or omissions resulting in homicide and
punishable as second degree manslaughter are: The act of the owner
of a mischievous animal, who knowing its propensities, negligently
suffers it to go at large, or keeps it without ordinary care (Minne-
sota and South Dakota);" the act of one who negligently overloads a
boat (South Dakota, North Dakota, and Ohio);10 and the act of one
who negligently causes an explosion of a steam engine or other steam
apparatus (South Dakota, North Dakota, and Ohio)."
Kansas and Wisconsin incorporate into their statutes defining
third degree manslaughter some provisions as to criminal negligence.
Both of these states punish "culpable negligence" as third degree man-
slaughter where homicide is committed by one who is committing a
trespass or other injury to private rights or property." Kansas has a
statute identical with those of Minnesota and South Dakota relating
to the owner of a mischievous animal, the Kansas statute differing in
that it punishes such negligence as third degree manslaughter, while
in the other two states it is treated as second degree manslaughter."
Wisconsin has a statute making one guilty of third degree manslaugh-
ter whose negligence causes a collision or explosion in the operation
of a steamboat or railroad train resulting in death." Kansas alone
"Utah Rev. Stat. (1933) Sec. 103-28-5; N. M. Stat. Ann. (Court-
right, 1929) Sec. 35-305; Mont. Rev. Code (Choate, 1921, Supp. 1927)
Sec. 10959.
"Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford & Moses, 1921, Supp. 1927) Secs. 2362,
2313.
"Ann. Code of Ohio (1934) Sec. 2228.
'IN. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913, Supp. 1925) See. 9491; N. Y. Con-
solidated Laws (Cahill, 1930) Sec. 1052; N. H. Pub. Laws (1926) c.
392, Sec. 392; S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) See. 4024; Minn. Gen. Stat.
(1923) See. 10078.
"'Minn. Gen. Stat. (1923) Sec. 10080; S. D. Comp. Laws (1929)
Sec. 4025.
16 S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) Sec. 4026; N. D. Comp. Laws (1913,
Supp. 1925) Sec. 9493; Ann. Code of Ohio (1934) See. 2230.
" S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) Sec. 4023; N. D. Comp. Laws (1913,
Supp. 1925) Secs. 9495, 9494; Ann. Code of Ohio (1934) Sec. 2331.
"Kan. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1923, Supp. 1933) Sec. 21-414; Wis. Stat.
(1931) Sec. 340.19.
1, Kan. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1923, Supp. 1933) Sec. 21-415.
"Wis. Stat. (1931) Sec. 340.22.
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brings criminal negligence within the borders of fourth degree man-
slaughter by specifying that homicide resulting from "culpable negli-
gence" is to be thus classified.
Again like the situation in regard to murder, there are states
indicating no separate degrees of manslaughter. Of these, Mississippi,
Florida, Wyoming, and Missouri incorporate into their statutes the
term "culpable negligence", while Georgia, Arizona, Oregon, and
Nevada make use of the phrase "lawful act without due caution and
circumspection".' Here again numerous specific acts or omissions are
provided for: while in the commission of a trespass or other injury
to private rights or property (Mississippi);-4 the dangerous animal
provision mentioned above (Mississippi, Florida, Washington, and
Missouri);Z negligently overloading a boat (Mississippi, Florida,
Washington, and Nevada);u negligently racing a steamboat (Flor-
ida) ;' and recklessness or gross negligence in the operation of any
other steam engine (Nevada).2 Missouri has a statute providing "If
any master, owner, engineer, or pilot of any steamboat or engineer,
conductor, superintendent, or manager, of any railroad train or loco-
motive engine . . . shall willfully or negligently run or operate any
such engine, boat, or train of cars as to endanger the life of any per-
son, he shall upon conviction be fined in any sum not exceeding five
hundred dollars, and if any accident happen by reason thereof by which
any person is killed, the person so offending shall be deemed guilty of
manslaughter."'
A Texas statute defining a crime designated as negligent homicide
illustrates an altogether different method of treatment. This statute
provides that "Whoever in the performance of a lawful act shall by
negligence and carelessness cause the death of another, is guilty of
negligent homicide. A lawful act is one not forbidden by penal law
and one which would give no just occasion for a civil action." Sub-
sequent provisions state that "To constitute this offense there must
be an apparent danger of causing death of the person killed or some
other person," and also that "The want of proper care and caution
Kan. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1923, Supp. 1933) Sec. 21-420.
iIss. Code Ann. (1930) Sec. 1023; Fla. Comp. Laws (1927) Sec.
7141; Wyo. Rev. Stat. (1931) See. 32-205; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929) Sec.
3988.
" Ga. Code (Parks, 1914, Supp. 1926) Sec. 64; Ariz. Code (Struck-
meyer, 1928) Sec. 4586; Ore. Code Ann. (1930) Sec. 14-206; New.
Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) Sec. 10069.
-1Miss. Code Ann. (1930) Sec. 997.
r Miss. Code Ann. (1930) Sec. 998; Fla. Comp. Laws (1927) See.
7146; Code of Wash. (Pierce, 1929) See. 9004; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929)
Sec. 3992.
-11%Miss. Code Ann. (1930) Sec. 999; Fla. Comp. Laws (1927) Sec.
7147; Code of Wash. (Pierce, 1929) Sec. 9005; Nev. Comp. Laws
(Hillyer, 1929) Sec. 10088.
' Fia. Comp. Laws (1927) See. 7148.
21Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) Sec. 10090.
" Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929) Sec. 3996.
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distinguishes this offense from excusable homicide. The degree of
care and caution is such as a man of ordinary prudence would use
under like circumstances. To bring the offense within the definition
of negligent homicide, there must be no apparent intention to kill.
Murder is distinguished from every other species of homicide by the
absence of circumstances which reduce the offense to negligent homi-
cide or manslaughter.""M
The remainder of those statutes pertaining to homicide caused by
negligence are those relating to specifically named acts, in which stat-
utes the offense is not classified as murder, manslaughter, etc., but
merely as a felony, or in some instances only by a provision for pun-
ishment. Maine has one of this type regarding the act of one who
kills another negligently while hunting.
3' Maine, Massachusetts, and
Minnesota have statutes relating to the negligent operation of steam-
boats.- Those states having statutes punishing homicide resulting
from the negligent operation of any vehicle are Louisiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, and Connecticut.? Arizona, Utah, and Montana have stat-
utes relating to negligence in causing a train collision.
3' Utah, Ten-
nessee, and Montana have statutes punishing the negligent manage-
ment of a steam apparatus from which death results.? Alabama pun-
ishes any engineer whose negligence results in a death." Tennessee
punishes negligence in the operation of a train resulting in death.
New Hampshire provides that "Whoever upon any way operates any
vehicle recklessly, or so that the lives or safety of the public might be
endangered . .. shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars, or
imprisoned not more than six months or both; and for the second
offense shall be imprisoned not less than one month nor more than
one year. If death of any person results from the reckless operation
of a motor vehicle, the person convicted of such reckless operation
shall, in lieu of any other penalty imposed by this section, be fined
not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both, provided that the provisions of this statute shall
not be construed to limit or reduce prosecutions for manslaughter."',
Since what amounts to criminal negligence with one particular
instrumentality will oftentimes not amount to criminal negligence in
"Tex. Pen. Code (1925) Sees. 1231-1238.
"Me. Rev. Stat. (1930, Supp. 1931) c. 129, Sec. 3.
-2Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) Sec. - ; Minn. Stat. (1923) Sec. 10083;
Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 265, See. 30.
"La. Code Crim. Pro. (1932) Sec. 1047; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929)
Sec. 16743; Minn. Gen. Stat. (1923) Sec. 10082; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930)
Sec. 6047.
"Utah Rev. Stat. (1933) Sec. 103-46-27; Ariz. Rev. Code (1923)
Sec. 4692; Mont. Rev. Code (1921, Supp. 1927) Sec. 11230.
'Utah Rev. Stat. (1933) Sec. 103-52-3; Tenn. Code (1932) Sec.
10810; Mont. Rev. Code (Choate, 1921, Supp. 1927) Sec. 11229.
"Ala. Code (1923) Sec. 5334.
3TTenn. Code (1932) Sec. 10815.
"sN. H. Pub. Laws (1926) c. 102, Sec. 11.
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regard to another instrumentality, a complicated situation may be
averted by specific provisions such as those in the above paragraph.
By statutes of this nature one of the fundamental purposes of criminal
law, that of deterrence, is best served. By providing that negligence
in the use of a firearm resulting in the death of another is punishable
as a crime, rather than lumping all criminally negligent acts within
a manslaughter statute, all uncertainty is dispensed with, and conse-
quently public attention is drawn to the fact that great care must be
exercised while handling firearms. The same would be true in regard
to vehicles and in all other common situations, but because of the
numerous situations through which a negligent homicide may result,
we can not hope to make specific provision for each. For these less
common occurrences, some effective method of treatment is essential.
It is readily discernible that a statute wholly devoted to the problem
of negligence is infinitely more expedient than one in which both in-
tentional and negliget acts are attempted to be dealt with. The Texas
statute quoted above as defining the crime of negligent homicide is
advantageous for this reason. By being specifically designed to deal
with criminal negligence, it avoids the broadness of statement and
ambiguity of the other type of statute. The Texas statute is therefore
to be preferred above any of the murder and manslaughter statutes
quoted.
There are numerous statutes dealing with negligence wherein
homicide does not result. These statutes differ to such an extent in
both their subject matter and their form as to make it exceedingly
more difficulty to classify them than those regarding homicide, and in
many instances it becomes necessary to repeat the exact provisions of
the statutes in order to fully set forth their import. West Virginia has
a statute punishing one who negligently shoots or wounds a human
being or any live stock while hunting.' Vermont makes it a felony
to carelessly or negligently wound another by gun shot.*' Arizona pro-
vides that one who "carelessly discharges a firearm in public or in a
business house, thereby endangering the life or person of another, or
disturbing any of the inmates thereof, or shall thereby injure, destroy
or damage any property therein, or who shall discharge the same in
any city or town of this state, except in necessary self-defense "is
guilty of a misdemeanor." Alabama punishes for a misdemeanor one
who recklessly handles firearms on a train in the presence of other
passengers.' 2
Those statutes dealing with negligence in the operation of vehicles
constitute an important part of the statutes within the group relating
to negligence wherein homicide does not result. Maine has a provi-
sion relating to one who "operates any vehicle recklessly or in a man-
' W. Va. Official Code (1931) c. 61, Art. 7, Sec. 11.
4OVt. Pub. Laws (1933) Sec. 8414.
"Ariz. Rev. Code (1923) Sec. 4723.
"Ala. Code (1923) Sec. 5362.
K. L. J-6
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ner so as to endanger any person or property."" Ohio has a similar
enactment referring however only to motor vehicles."4 A statute using
the verbiage "the operation of a motor vehicle at a speed greater than
is reasonably proper or such as to endanger the life or limb of any
person" is to be found in Nebraska."
Four states have provisions in respect to negligence in the oper-
ation of railroads. A Georgia and a South Carolina act provide that
"If any person employed in any capacity by any railroad company
doing business in this state, in the course of such employment, be
guilty of negligence either by an omission of duty or by any act of
commission, in relation to matters intrusted to him, or about which he
is employed, from which negligence serious bodily injury, but not
death, occurs to another, he shall be guilty of criminal negligence. .. "
Alabama punishes any engineer failing to use the proper precautions.4'
A Tennessee statute deals with "a wrongful act, gross negligence, or
an omission in the operation of a train resulting in the wounding or
crippling of any person.""8 South Carolia also provides that "a person
having control over a railroad train who is guilty of gross carelessness
or neglect" may be punished."
Several states more or less supplement their statutes pertaining
to homicide resulting from the negligent operation of boats by making
provision for punishment in the event that homicide does not result
from such conduct. North Dakota, South Dakota, and New York make
it a misdemeanor to endanger life by negligently overloading a boat.p
North Dakota and South Dakota also make it a misdemeanor for one
to be so grossly negligent in the operation of a steamboat as to cause
an explosion or any other accident resulting in endangering the life
of any human being.' South Carolina makes it a misdemeanor to be
so negligent in the operation of a steamboat as to cause an injury to
any person.P Oregon makes it a criminal offense to negligently mis-
manage a boat so as to injure property or to endanger life.p New
York punishes for a misdemeanor one who from gross neglect creates
an undue and unsafe pressure of steam."
Rhode Island has a statute dealing with "gross negligence by those
"3Me. Rev. Stat. (1930, Supp. 1931) c. 29, Sec. 86.
"Ohio Ann. Code (1934) See. 12603-1.
"Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929) Sec. 39-1102.
"Ga. Code (Parks, 1914, Supp. 1926) See. 117; S. C. Code (1932)
Sec. 1690.
TAla. Code (1923) Sec. 5333.
"8Tenn. Code (1932) See. 10814.
S. C. Code (1932) Sec. 1690.
"N. D. Comp. Laws (1913, Supp. 1925) Sec. 9707; S. D. Comp. Laws
(1929) Sec. 4125; N. Y. Consolidated Laws (Cahill, 1930) Sec. 1890.
uN. D. Comp. Laws (1913, Supp. 1925) Sec. 9708; S. D. Comp.
Laws (1929) Sec. 4126.
2S. C. Code (1932) Sec. 1126.
"Ore. Code Ann. (1930) Sec. 14-236.
"N. Y. Consolidated Laws (Cahill, 1930) Sec. 1892.
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in charge of a vehicle or vessel employed in the conveyance of pas-
sengers resulting in injury."' ' Alabama has a provision pertaining
to reckless driving.P
Washington has a provision making it a misdemeanor to be so
grossly negligent as to cause excessive boiler pressure or an explo-
sion in any steam apparatusYT Utah has a similar statute making it
a misdemeanor if human life is endangered.P New York, Nevada, and
South Dakota have almost identical statutes.?l Montana and North
Dakota make the same offense a felony.?
The states are not in accord on the manner in which they treat
the negligent injury to property. Colorado penalizes one who care-
lessly mars, defaces, mutilates, tears down, or destroys any sign, sign
board, post, or notice set up by the state0' Vermont makes it a mis-
demeanor to injure carelessly and without malice any public property.0
Wyoming punishes a bailee who carelessly destroys property."1 Ver-
mont also punishes one who negligently injures public shade trees."
Ohio makes it a criminal offense to injure negligently railroad prop-
erty. Arizona punishes any employee of a telegraph company who
negligently transmits a message, and also punishes one having the
duty to repair a bridge who negligently fails to do so.?6
Kansas provides that "if any person be maimed, wounded, or dis-
figured or receive great bodily harm, or his life be endangered by the
culpable negligence of another, in cases and under circumstances which
would constitute murder or manslaughter if death had ensued, the
person through whose negligence such injury shall be occasioned" shall
be punishedY Florida has a statute stating that "whoever through
culpable negligence or reckless disregard for the safety of others in-
flicts any personal injury or injuries upon another, not resulting in
death" shall be punished." Ohio makes it a misdemeanor for an
apothecary to be so negligent as to endanger human life or health."
New York has a statute providing that one who furnishes insecure
scaffolding shall be punished.?0 The statutes in this group are highly
5R. I. Gen. Laws (1923) Sec. 7850.
rAla. Code (1923) Sec. 3328.
6' Code of Wash. (Pierce, 1929) Sec. 9904.
"Utah Rev. Stat. (1933) Sec. 103-52-2.
59N. Y. Consolidated Laws (Cahill, 1930) Sec. 1893; Nev. Comp.
Laws (1929) Sec. 10270; S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) Sec. 4127.
Mont. Rev. Code (1921, Supp. 1927) Sec. 11195; N. D. Comp
Laws (1913, Supp. 1925) Sec. 9709.
0Colo. Ann. Stat. (Courtright, 1927) Sec. 1831H.
"Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) Sec. 8525.
"Wyo. Rev. Stat. (1931) Sec. 32-375.
"Vt. Gen. Laws (1917) Sec. 8536.
"Ohio Ann. Code (1934) See. 12603-1.
"Ariz. Code (Struckmeyer, 1928) Sec. 4865.
"Kan. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1923, Supp. 1933) Sec. 21-435.
I"Fla. Comp. Laws (1927) Sec. 7164.
61 Ohio Ann. Code (1934) Sec. 2438.
-IN. Y. Consolidated Laws (Cahill, 1930) Sec. 1276.
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advantageous, inasmuch as intent is a necessary element of criminal
assault at common law. In the absence of provisions of this nature
many negligent acts deserving punishment would go unpunished.
A statute, to the effect that "a jailer or other officer who negli-
gently suffers a prisoner in custody for a criminal offense to escape"
may be punished, is found in thirteen states." Twenty-two states have
statutes similar to that of Michigan stating thar one who "negligently
sets fire to the woods or grounds of another" may be punished. 2
Nevada punishes one who negligently leaves a campfire burning.1
3
Mississippi punishes one who carelessly places tacks on the highways."'
A summary of this nature points out the fact that criminal negli-
gence forms an important part of statutory criminal law. By observ-
ing the various types of statutes, we are able to discern which of them
are more advantageous. It is significant that Kentucky stands almost




A New York statute' declares that
"The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justi-
fiable, is murder in the first degree, when committed: ...
"2. By an act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing
a depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without a
premeditated design to effect the death of any individual ... "
7'Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 133, Sec. 15; Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns,
1926) Sec. 10-1806; Fla. Comp. Laws (1927) Sec. 7536; Wis. Stat.
(1929) Sec. 346.36; W. Va. Code (1913) c. 61, Art. 5, Sec. 9; R. I. Gen.
Laws (1923) Sec. 5998; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1930) Sec. 4506; Vt.
Gen. Laws (1917) Sec. 8672; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) Sec. 7839;
Ore. Code Ann. (1930) Sec. 14-422; Ohio Ann. Code (1934) Sec. 2480;
N. C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1927) Sec. 4405; N. H. Pub. Laws (1926)
c. 394, Sec. 15.
7 2 Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) Sec. 16942; Idaho Comp. Stat. (1919)
Sec. 17-2722; Colo. Ann. Stat. (Mills, 1930) Sec. 2011; Ariz. Code
(Struckmeyer, 1928) Sec. 4695, 4696; Ala. Code (Michie, 1928) Sec.
4112, 4113; W. Va. Code (1913) c. 61, Art. 3, Sec. 9; Code of Wash.
(Pierce, 1929) Sec. 8444; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1930) Sec. 4435;
Utah Rev. Stat. (1933) Sec. 103-22-1, 103-22-2; S. D. Comp. Laws
(1929) Sec. 3983; S. C. Code (1922) Sec. 1208; Ore. Code Ann. (1930)
Sec. 14-363; Mont. Rev. Stat. (Choate, 1921, Supp. 1925) Sec. 11501:
Ohio Ann. Code (1934) Sec. 12436; N. C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1927)
Sec. 4310; N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) Sec. 9775; N. Y. Consol-
idated Laws (Cahill, 1930) Sec. 1900; N. M. Stat. Ann. (Courtright,
1929) Sec. 35-1406; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) Sec. 10262;
N. H. Pub. Laws (1926) c. 391, Sec. 5; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929) Sec.
28-509.
13 Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) Sec. 10317.
"' Miss. Code Ann. (1930) Sec. 984,
IN. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1930) c. 41, § 1044.
